sUSN — Noon (Multi-chain)
sUSN is an ERC-4626 savings share over USN, a 24-month-old synthetic dollar whose $40.52M of attested reserves have covered supply on every one of 678 daily attestations (1.0343 on 5 October). The peg record is clean and the yield is organic, but the risk is concentrated: 63.46% of USN liabilities sits in one off-chain Luxembourg private-credit fund marked on a weekly signed report, there is no codified first-loss buffer and the platform operator can write down sUSN principal, the owner Safe can mint uncapped USN with no delay, and a reference-size exit at par is open only to onboarded Verified Users.
Strengths
- Reserves have never fallen below supply. Accountable's 678 daily attestations since October 2024 all read at or above 1.000, coverage was 1.0343 ($40.52M against $39.17M of USN) on 5 October, and DeFiLlama's USN supply reconciles to the attestation within −1.47%.
- The peg and operating record are clean: 0 of 596 USN daily closes outside ±50 bps, the worst executed print (−98 bps) recovered in under an hour, and 24 months of operation through four stress windows with no pause and no holder loss.
- The audit record is current. Noon lists nine audit engagements from 2024 to 2026, and the Ethereum and EVM-remote implementations executed on 1 October match the commit Hashlock reviewed in its September 2026 bridge rate-limiter audit (0 High, 1 Medium acknowledged).
- Bridge exposure is now rate-limited. Since 1 October each origin chain can mint at most 4M sUSN per 8 hours against the 11.05M sUSN Ethereum lockbox, and since 8 October changing a limit takes a 4-hour timelock on all six EVM chains. TAC and Sophon are deprecated and unlinked, and LayerZero legs require three independent verifiers.
Risks & Constraints
- One off-chain fund dominates. Fasanara's F-TAC sub-fund holds $24.86M, 61.36% of reserves and 63.46% of USN liabilities, valued on a manager-signed weekly report with T+3-month native redemption and no independent administrator statement; recovery is limited to the $1.34M surplus, a 5.41% break-even haircut.
- Exit quality depends on who the holder is. Onboarded Verified Users can redeem USN at par through an approval-gated rail capped at 5M USN a day, and every non-dust use so far has come from one operator-linked cluster. A holder limited to the open market clears only $0.93M–$1.19M of the $3.65M reference within 6% over 24 hours.
- Privileged powers are broad. The 3-of-6 owner Safe can make itself USN admin and mint uncapped USN with no delay, and the ForDefi MPC wallets on Starknet and Sui can upgrade their deployments with no delay and reach the whole 11.05M sUSN lockbox within one 8-hour rate-limit window.
- Losses are not ring-fenced. No first-loss layer is codified on-chain (the 0.56% insurance fund sits inside reserves), the platform operator may cut sUSN principal pro rata under Staking Terms s.11, and $7.59M of debt is borrowed against sUSN collateral, 27.3 times the depth available to unwind it.
Verdict & conditions
Tier 3 — Adequate. The APB composite is 2.75, 0.15 above the Tier 2 ceiling and 0.26 below the Tier 4 floor. The Protocol composite of 3.22 exceeds 3.0, so the Protocol track takes the 1.5× weight penalty. No area grades F in any track, and the F-gate passes.
sUSN is fully reserved, has a clean two-year peg record and pays an organic yield, but almost every material risk traces back to a small number of parties: one off-chain private-credit fund behind most of the backing, one operator-linked wallet cluster behind most of the holder base and exit liquidity, and a small set of Safes and MPC wallets with undelayed powers.
Three rows grade D and carry 1.5× weight within their tracks. Asset 7 (dependencies) is D because 63.46% of USN liabilities sits in one off-chain fund whose failure would cost holders far more than 10%. Protocol 5 (loss absorption) is D because no first-loss capital is codified on-chain and every par redemption to date has gone to linked addresses, so outsiders would absorb a shortfall. Protocol 7 (integrations) is D because $7.59M of debt is borrowed against sUSN, 27.3 times the depth available to unwind it, and 21.9% of that debt sits in markets whose caps can be raised with no delay.
The rating is sensitive to the F-TAC position. A one-letter improvement in the linked Asset 7 and Protocol 6 rows gives 2.67, still Tier 3; a one-letter deterioration takes Asset 7 to F and fails the F-gate.
Conditions to revisit:
- Exit capacity depends on the holder's route. The C on liquidity applies to Verified Users with par redemption; for a holder without that access, the open market's $0.93M–$1.19M per 24 hours (within 6%) is the realistic limit.
- Re-rate on any non-dust RedeemHandlerV2 rejection or expiry, an approval taking more than 24 hours, a daily cap below the $3.65M reference, or an unfunded redemption treasury with a request pending for more than 24 hours.
- Watch the F-TAC report. A report older than 8 days, any restated or gated F-TAC mark, or F-TAC above two-thirds of liabilities is a down-trigger; a realised F-TAC loss moves Asset 7 to F.
- Improvements that would move the rating up: an independent F-TAC administrator NAV with F-TAC below 50% of liabilities, a codified first-loss layer of at least 1% of TVL, a USN mint cap or timelocked
setAdmin, and a timelock on Starknet and Sui upgrades. - Next scheduled re-evaluation: 4 November 2026.

Rating evolution
The headline is almost unchanged, and the small rise does not mean Noon's protocol got worse. Almost all of the upward pressure comes from the Blockchain track, which grades the chains sUSN runs on rather than Noon's own contracts.
| Track | June 2026 | October 2026 | APB if only this track had changed |
|---|---|---|---|
| General | 2.93 | 2.33 | 2.56 (−0.16) |
| Asset | 2.94 | 2.94 | 2.72 (0.00) |
| Protocol | 3.18 | 3.22 | 2.73 (+0.01) |
| Blockchain | 1.25 | 2.25 | 2.89 (+0.17) |
| APB | 2.72 | 2.75 |
Blockchain is the main driver. In June the rating covered Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM, and every chain-level row graded A on Ethereum's strength. sUSN now runs on ten chains, including Starknet, Sui and Berachain. The updated method weights each chain by its share of sUSN float, reserves an A only when every material chain reaches it, and lets a material chain's hard limit bind a row. Under it, six chain-level rows moved from A to B, and decentralisation moved from A to C on Starknet's lack of forced inclusion. The one Blockchain row Noon controls directly, bridge security, was C in June and is C now, with per-chain rate limits live since 1 October. With Blockchain held at its June value, the October rating would be 2.57, Tier 2.
Protocol is essentially flat. The track moved from 3.18 to 3.22 and adds 0.01 to the composite on its own. It still takes the over-3.0 weight penalty, with D rows on loss absorption and reflexive integrations.
General improved on an updated review. Smart Contract Security rose on the September Hashlock audit, the On-Chain Financial Audit was graded for the first time, and Team was graded on the published team page.
Asset is unchanged at 2.94, but its make-up shifted under two other method changes:
- Liquidity is graded against a defined reference exit of 10% of TVL ($3.65M) on the route that binds under stress. For onboarded Verified Users that test is met through the at-par redemption rail added in September; the open market remains thin.
- Single-counterparty concentration is sized explicitly. The F-TAC position was already about 65% of reserves in June. Under the sizing test (more than 50% of liabilities, with loss-given-failure above 10%), it now grades D.
The tier scale was also realigned across the site in September 2026: Tier 3 now spans 2.61–3.00, previously 2.26–3.00. Both 2.72 and 2.75 are Tier 3 under either scale.
Overview
| Position | Hold sUSN, an ERC-4626 share over USN. USN is a synthetic dollar issued by Noon YBS Issuer Ltd (BVI) that expressly "does not represent a claim" on reserves; sUSN is junior to USN and absorbs shortfalls through discretionary pro-rata principal reduction under Staking Terms s.11 |
| Mechanism | KYB-onboarded institutions mint USN against USDC/USDT (minimum $1M) through MinterHandlerV2. Collateral moves to the operator wallet and into off-chain and on-chain sleeves. Returns are split 80% to sUSN, 10% to the Noon Insurance Fund and 10% to an Operations Fund, and reach sUSN as daily vault rebases that can only add assets |
| Backing | $40.52M of attested reserves against $39.17M of USN (coverage 1.0343, 5 Oct). Fasanara F-TAC private credit 61.36%, Hyperliquid HYPE basis 15.76%, stable cash 6.97%, US T-bills 6.58%, JAAA AAA-CLO ETF 4.42%, Euler and Morpho lending 4.91%. On-chain lines (38.6% of reserves) are verified on a 15-minute cadence; the F-TAC line rests on a weekly signed report |
| Yield | 7.36% APY over 30 days (to 30 Sep); monthly 7.15–12.93% over the last year; share price 1.227075 USN per sUSN and never lower. About 80% of gross return is F-TAC mark accrual; NOON points add about 7.9% |
| Exit | Verified Users (34 whitelisted addresses): par redemption of USN through RedeemHandlerV2, approval-gated, 5M USN per day; 8 of them can also unstake sUSN instantly, the rest wait the 7-day cooldown first. Everyone else: the 7-day cooldown into USN, then the open market, which clears about $275k in one trade within 2% and $0.93M–$1.19M over 24 hours within 6% |
| Chains | Ten chains: Ethereum (60.57% of float), Base (21.99%), Starknet (5.66%), Sui (5.38%), Berachain (3.59%), HyperEVM (2.80%), with negligible supply on zkSync Era and Citrea, and on TAC and Sophon, which are deprecated and unlinked. Remote sUSN is backed 1:1 by 11.05M sUSN (39.43% of supply) locked on Ethereum and bridged over Hyperlane and LayerZero, rate-limited at 4M sUSN per 8 hours per origin chain, with limit changes behind a 4-hour timelock |
Key metrics
| Metric | Value | Date (UTC) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| USN reserve coverage | 1.034332 ($40,517,173 vs $39,172,325; surplus $1,344,847); 678 daily points since 8 Oct 2024, none below 1.000 | 2026-10-05 | Accountable proof of solvency |
| F-TAC exposure | $24,860,236 = 61.36% of reserves = 63.46% of USN liabilities (63.10% on 30 Sep); signed report dated 28 Sep, 7.4 days old | 2026-10-05 | Accountable |
| Break-even F-TAC haircut | 5.41% (4.59% excluding the insurance fund); 2.40% on 30 Sep | 2026-10-05 | Accountable, derived |
| Verified share of reserves | 38.6% at the highest verification level (on-chain, 15-minute cadence); F-TAC and Binance lines at the signed-report level | 2026-10-05 | Accountable |
| DeFiLlama reconciliation | USN circulating $38,597,821 vs attested supply $39,172,325 (−1.47%); protocol TVL $36.95M (peak $39.13M, 28 Aug) | 2026-10-05 | DeFiLlama |
| sUSN supply / share price | 28,024,429 sUSN (29,318,537 on 30 Sep) / 1.227075 USN per sUSN, never declined | 2026-10-05 | On-chain |
| Paid sUSN APY | 7.36% over 30 days (206,173 USN of rebases); last 12 months 7.15–12.93% monthly | 2026-09-30 | On-chain rebases |
| Cash-verifiable share of yield | 24.6% of the paid rate (Hyperliquid funding, T-bills, JAAA, DeFi lending); F-TAC mark accrual 80.3% of gross return | 2026-09-30 | Derived |
| Exit reference | $3,645,683 (10% of TVL on 30 Sep); $3,438,808 at 5 Oct | 2026-10-05 | Derived |
| Open-market exit | Single trade on Ethereum: 1.60% at $275k, 8.40% at $300k, 92.46% at the reference. Paced 24h within 6%: $931,522–$1,188,781 (25.6–32.6% of the reference); 7 days 85.7% | 2026-10-05 | KyberSwap, CoW, LI.FI quotes |
| Verified User par rail | 5M USN/day and 1M/block caps; 15 requests all-time, 13 approved in 0.04–0.98 h, 0 rejected, 2 dust expired; largest 24h payout 1,906,844 USN | 2026-10-05 | On-chain (RedeemHandlerV2) |
| Issuer idle buffer | Stable cash $2,825,367 + T-bills $2,664,772 = 151% of the reference; redemption treasury float $140,483 | 2026-10-05 | Accountable, on-chain |
| Largest holders | Largest wallet 34.17% of supply; the three vault-programme borrower wallets 82.34% (gross) | 2026-10-05 | Noon registry, on-chain |
| sUSN market price vs NAV | −0.60% (pool 1.21973 vs NAV 1.22708), below −50 bps since 28 Sep | 2026-10-05 | On-chain |
| USN peg | 0 of 596 daily closes outside ±50 bps; worst executed print 0.99015 (−98 bps, 24 Jul 2026), recovered within 0.99 h | 2024-10 to 2026-10 | On-chain swaps |
| Bridge lockbox | 11,050,706 sUSN locked on Ethereum (39.43% of supply) vs 11,050,692 remote; per-origin limit 4M sUSN per 8h | 2026-10-05 | On-chain |
| Debt against sUSN collateral | $7,593,158 across 8 lending markets = 27.3x unwind depth; no liquidations on Morpho or Vesu to date | 2026-09-30 | On-chain |
| Hyperliquid basis | Short 60,437 HYPE ($5.60M notional, 10x cross), hedge ratio 1.0001, liquidation price +87.2% | 2026-10-05 | Hyperliquid API |
| Nexus Mutual cover | $2,765,832 across 3 policies ($3,265,833 on 30 Sep); terms not reviewed | 2026-10-05 | Accountable |
| Operating history | USN live 24.0 months, vault 22.9 months; 0 pause events; vault upgraded 17 times, USN 5 times | 2026-10-05 | On-chain |

Economic model & what you are holding
USN is minted only by KYB-onboarded institutions, against USDC or USDT with a $1M minimum. The collateral passes through Noon's operator wallet into a mixed book. The largest sleeve by far is Fasanara Tactical Private Credit (F-TAC), a sub-fund of a Luxembourg ELTIF umbrella with an external AIFM (Ascender Fund Partners) and auditor (KPMG). The rest is a delta-neutral HYPE funding-rate position on Hyperliquid, US T-bills and the JAAA AAA-CLO ETF held through Alpaca, Euler and Morpho lending, and stable cash. Returns are split 80% to sUSN, 10% to the Noon Insurance Fund and 10% to an Operations Fund, and reach sUSN as daily rebases that can only add assets.
| Token | Role / seniority | Yield basis | Mint | Redemption | Character |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USN | Stable liability of Noon YBS Issuer Ltd (BVI); "does not represent a claim" | None directly (NOON points) | Permissioned, against USDC/USDT, $1M minimum | Par through RedeemHandlerV2 for 34 whitelisted Verified Users, approval-gated, 5M USN/day; secondary holders "may not redeem" | Unsecured synthetic dollar backed by an off-chain credit and basis book |
| sUSN | ERC-4626 share over USN; junior, absorbs shortfalls via s.11 principal reduction | 80% of returns via add-only rebases; share price 1.227075 | Permissionless USN deposit | 7-day cooldown into USN (permissionless), or instant for 8 vault-whitelisted addresses | Yield-bearing exposure to private credit and basis |
| NOON | Governance and points token, 1B fixed supply | Points from a 65% community allocation | — | — | Incentive layer, about 7.9% of sUSN yield |
Loss waterfall. No first-loss layer is codified on-chain. The Noon Insurance Fund ($204k, 0.56% of supply) is an uncodified Safe counted inside reserves. After it comes the economic surplus ($1.34M), and after that losses fall on sUSN holders through the platform operator's "absolute right" to reduce sUSN principal pro rata on a Suspension Event. No trustee for token holders is identified, and holders have no claim on reserves. Nexus Mutual cover of $2.77M exists, but its terms were not reviewed.
What the holder is getting into:
- A private-credit position in a stablecoin wrapper. Almost two-thirds of USN liabilities is one Luxembourg fund marked by a manager-signed weekly report, with T+3-month native redemption.
- A yield that is mostly accrual. Only 24.6% of the paid rate is matched by legs that can be verified in cash. No F-TAC cash receipt has been observed at a Noon wallet since the F-TAC integration in 2025, so a restated or gated F-TAC mark would leave roughly three-quarters of past yield uncovered.
- An exit whose quality depends on who you are. A KYB Verified User can redeem USN at par within hours on the record to date. A secondary holder queues for 7 days into USN and then sells into about $275k of depth supplied by the operator-linked cluster.

Top risks, ranked
| # | Risk | Mechanism | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Exit quality hinges on holder type and one cluster | Open market: 25.6–32.6% of the reference per paced 24 hours within 6%. Verified Users: a discretionary par rail funded by manual top-ups and used so far only by cluster-linked requesters | Critical |
| 2 | F-TAC credit concentration | 63.46% of liabilities in one off-chain fund on a signed weekly report; recovery limited to a 5.41% surplus | High |
| 3 | Uncapped USN mint by the owner Safe | setAdmin + mint with no cap and no delay; only the 3-of-6 threshold stands in the way | High |
| 4 | Undelayed spoke authority reaching the lockbox | The Starknet ForDefi MPC wallet, or the two Hyperlane validator operators on the default route, can release up to 12M sUSN per 8-hour window, 100% of the lockbox; the Sui MPC wallet 4M | High |
| 5 | First-loss inversion | 0% codified buffer; the par rail has no coverage link and linked addresses exit first; residual loss falls on queued holders via s.11 | High |
| 6 | Reflexive leverage on thin depth | $7.59M of sUSN-collateral debt across 8 markets = 27.3x unwind depth; Euler and Vesu caps can be raised instantly | High |
| 7 | Holder concentration and forced sellers | Largest wallet 34.17%, borrower set 82.34% and rising; those wallets owe vault depositors and hold thin liquid assets | High |
| 8 | Weak holder recourse, offshore issuer | USN is not a claim on reserves; redemption is unsecured and open only to onboarded users; the platform operator may cut sUSN principal | High |
| 9 | Off-chain single point of failure | F-TAC 61.36% of reserves with no committed fallback; transparency is detective only | High |
| 10 | Yield rests on unrealised marks | 80.3% of gross return is F-TAC accrual; 24.6% is cash-verifiable | Medium |
Ranks 11–19 are in the appendix.
General DD
General composite: 2.33. General DD covers six areas and draws on the VALIS review dated 23 September 2026, updated on 5 October for the September Hashlock audit, the reserve reconciliation and Noon's published team page, and on 12 October for Noon's governance changes. VALIS also graded a seventh "Bridge Security" row F on automated findings; that row is outside the six General areas, and bridges are assessed under Blockchain 7.
| # | Area | Grade | Observation | Why not adjacent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Governance and access control | C | Verified 3-of-6 Safe, 48h upgrade timelock and a 4h timelock on bridge limits, LayerZero configuration and redemption and minter settings, but a codeless key holds a live MINTER role and vault and USN emergency operations have no timelock | Not B: material undelayed powers remain. Not D: core upgrades sit behind a multisig and timelock |
| 2 | Smart contract security | B | Nine audits, four dated 2026, latest Hashlock September 2026; the live Ethereum and EVM-remote implementations equal the reviewed commit | Not A: MinterHandlerV2 runs a pre-remediation build, the zkSync OFT builds are outside documented scope, and the bug bounty is email-only. Not C: every fund-holding Ethereum proxy is covered by the latest audit |
| 3 | Oracle security | C | Live Stork and Chainlink stack, but single-source critical feeds, no fallback, nanosecond timestamps that disable consumer staleness checks, and a hardcoded USN fixed-rate oracle | Not B: no redundancy. Not D: feeds are live and coherent |
| 4 | On-chain financial audit | C | DeFiLlama reconciles USN supply within −1.47%; Accountable splits reserves into 21 lines and verifies 38.6% on-chain | Not B: the 61.36% F-TAC sleeve is attested only by a signed report. Not D: supply, reserves and flows reconcile |
| 5 | Team reputation and transparency | A | noon.capital/about lists nine team members with roles and eight LinkedIn profiles | The page gives first names only, names no directors or legal entity, and the profiles were not independently verified; see Operational risk |
| 6 | Economic design | B | Revenue-share ERC-4626 yield with no emissions and no reflexive loop | Not A: off-chain-only attestation of the main sleeve and a Fasanara deploy/custody conflict |
At C on Team, the General composite would be 2.67 and the APB 2.84, still Tier 3.
Asset DD
Asset composite: 2.94. The backing is fully reserved and the peg is tight, but the exit, the holder base and the backing each concentrate in a few parties. Asset 7 is the only D; a second D in this track would take the composite above 3.0 and add an Asset track penalty.
| # | Area | Grade | Observation | Why not adjacent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Asset mechanism & design | C | Coverage at or above 1.000 on every daily point (1.0343 on 5 Oct); F-TAC 61.36% of reserves on a signed report | Not B: a single 61% off-chain fund is not "minimal, exceptionally safe". Not D: documented assets exceed 100% and past dips were recognition timing, not write-downs |
| 2 | Ownership & supply distribution | C | Largest wallet 34.17%, vault-programme borrower set 82.34% (gross, up from 79.18%); largest holder 9.93% when borrower sUSN is attributed to the vaults' USDC depositors | Not B: concentration is far above B's top-ten bound. Not D: graded on the depositor look-through; on gross wallet balances the row would be D |
| 3 | Liquidity & market depth | C | Verified User par rail: 5M USN/day cap, 13 of 13 non-dust approvals in 0.04–0.98 h, 4.54M USN in 5 days. Open market: 25.6–32.6% of the reference per 24h within 6% | Not B: the rail is gated, discretionary and funded by top-ups. Not D: no rejection, expiry or block over 24 hours on record. Applies only to Verified Users |
| 4 | Volatility & price behaviour | A | USN 0 of 596 daily closes outside 50 bps; worst executed print −98 bps, recovered within an hour; sUSN −0.60% vs NAV for 6.6 days | Not B: no daily close or stress window breached 50 bps. The open sUSN discount is the main reason to watch this row |
| 5 | Smart contract implementation | C | All in-scope code verified; bridge minting bounded at 4M per 8h per origin; mintAndRebase capped at 25k USN per call; USN setAdmin + mint uncapped with no delay | Not B: an unbounded mint hook remains and MinterHandlerV2 drifts from its audit. Not D: every other critical hook is bounded on-chain |
| 6 | Incentives & sustainability | C | Incentives about 7.9% of yield; 80.3% of gross return is F-TAC mark accrual; cash-verifiable legs cover 24.6% of the paid rate | Not B: three-quarters of the payout lacks evidenced cash. Not D: the accrual is private credit, not a market-inverting leg, and the rate has never fallen |
| 7 | Dependencies & external risks | D | F-TAC $24.86M = 63.46% of liabilities (up from 63.10%); recovery limited to the 5.41% surplus | Not C: more than 50% to one off-chain counterparty with loss-given-failure above 10%. Not F: F-TAC is identified and regulated and has not failed |
| 8 | Regulatory & issuer risk | C | Unlicensed BVI issuer; separate platform operator; USN "does not represent a claim"; operator has s.11 write-down right | Not B: an offshore unlicensed issuer is capped at C. Not D: reserves are segregated and attested live, and both entities are named first-party |
Asset 3 (C, Verified Users only). The rated holder is an onboarded Verified User whitelisted on RedeemHandlerV2 for USN-to-USDC par redemption, with the issuer's idle buffer behind the rail. On that basis the C condition — "KYC/whitelist-gated redemption that is reliable (reference-size exits within days)" — is met on the record: the daily cap is 137% of the reference, all 13 non-dust requests were approved in under an hour with none rejected, and 4.54M USN was paid out in five days. The weaknesses are real. Approval is discretionary. The treasury float is only $140k, so payouts rely on issuer top-ups, and the $5.49M idle buffer is not contractually committed. Holders who are not also vault-whitelisted (26 of 34) first wait the 7-day cooldown. No arms-length Verified User has yet used the rail: every non-dust request came from the operator-linked cluster, and the 24 non-cluster whitelisted addresses hold 2.1% of the reference. A holder limited to the open market faces a different asset. A single trade on Ethereum moves 1.60% at $275k and 92.46% at the reference; paced over 24 hours, only $0.93M–$1.19M clears within 6%, and the best 7-day result is 85.7%. On that route liquidity meets the F condition. The row moves to D on any non-dust rejection or expiry, an approval lead over 24 hours, the rail paused for more than 24 hours, a daily cap below the reference, an unfunded treasury with a request pending over 24 hours, a non-cluster whitelist removal, or stable cash plus T-bills falling below the reference.

Asset 7 (D). F-TAC is a sub-fund of Fasanara Investments IV SA SICAV ELTIF (LEI 213800Q5VPA7XPK9HU52), with an external AIFM and KPMG as umbrella auditor; its administrator and depositary are not disclosed. At $24.86M it is 61.36% of reserves and 63.46% of USN liabilities. The share of liabilities has increased since 30 September (from 63.10%) because USN supply fell while the F-TAC line stayed flat. The position is valued on a manager-signed weekly report, the latest dated 28 September, and redeems natively on T+3 months. Recovery in a loss is limited to the $1.34M surplus, a 5.41% break-even haircut (2.40% on 30 September). Concentration above 50% in one off-chain counterparty with loss-given-failure well above 10% is D on the sizing rule. The row is not F because F-TAC is identified and regulated and has not failed. It moves to F on a realised F-TAC loss.

Asset 2 (C). Read on gross wallet balances, one wallet holds 34.17% of sUSN and the three borrower wallets of Noon's own vault programme hold 82.34%, both above the D thresholds (30% single, 70% top ten). Those wallets borrow USDC from Accountable vaults whose depositors hold the credit claim; attributing borrower sUSN to those depositors gives a largest holder of 9.93% and a top pair of 19.07%, which sets the C. Concentration is rising: the largest wallet held no sUSN before July 2026.
Asset 5 (C). Every critical hook except one is bounded on-chain: bridge minting at 4M sUSN per 8 hours per origin, mintAndRebase at 25,000 USN per call, and MinterHandlerV2's mint at 10M per block and per day (limits that take 4 hours to change since 12 October). The exception is USN itself: the owner Safe can call setAdmin on itself and then mint any amount, with no delay. Neither the 48-hour upgrade timelock nor the 4-hour settings timelock covers that path. C is also the post-audit ceiling, because MinterHandlerV2 runs the build Sherlock reviewed before remediation and the zkSync OFT builds sit outside documented audit scope. The row moves to D on any use of the uncapped path or any new unbounded hook.
Asset 8 (C). The issuer, Noon YBS Issuer Ltd, is a BVI company with no disclosed licence. The sUSN Staking Terms, s.2 identify Noon HoldCo Ltd as the platform operator, a separate legal entity from the issuer. Noon has confirmed directly that Noon HoldCo Ltd is the holding company for all Noon activities and is an orphaned entity whose shares are held by a BVI Purpose Trust. The holding company, issuer and shareholder trust have distinct roles. Holders have no claim on backing, and s.11 gives the platform operator the right to reduce staked principal proportionally to losses during a Suspension Event. Governing law is BVI, with arbitration, a class-action waiver and a 12-month claims bar.
Protocol DD
Protocol composite: 3.22, above 3.0, so the track takes the 1.5× weight penalty. The mechanism has worked for 24 months and has never lost holder funds, but losses are unallocated and two rows stand at D: loss absorption (Protocol 5) and reflexive integrations (Protocol 7).
| # | Area | Grade | Observation | Why not adjacent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Protocol design & mechanics | C | Original ERC-4626 vault (~23 months); two-tier exit (instant for whitelisted addresses, 7-day escrow for everyone else); no on-chain loss recognition | Not B: no coverage-linked gate or pro-rata exit in a shortfall. Not D: exits are ordered by access but not trapped |
| 2 | Proven model & lineage | C | Original code diff-matched to audited commits; arms-length exits about 22.8M USN; 85.9% of par redemptions to operator-linked addresses | Not B: capital processed is small and mostly insider-circulated. Not D: lineage is clear and the model has run 23 months |
| 3 | Fee structure & economic model | C | No on-chain fee variable or setter; rebases can only add assets; the take share is chosen off-chain with no on-chain maximum or timelock | Not B: no dated revenue against disclosed running costs. Not D: no setting can reach held balances, and every redemption path keeps a minimum-out |
| 4 | Operational history & stress performance | B | 24.0 months live; USN never closed below 0.995 across four stress windows; 0 pauses; the April 2026 LayerZero incident resolved with no holder loss | Not A: no multi-downturn record at growing organic TVL. Not C: TVL is within 6% of its peak and every upgrade since March 2026 went through the 48h timelock |
| 5 | Liquidation & risk management | D | Codified first-loss layer 0.000%; insurance fund 0.561% (uncodified); 17 of 17 par payouts to linked addresses; redemption-rail setters unbounded, behind a 4h timelock | Not C: only codified capital counts toward the ~1% buffer test. Not F: no bad debt and no failed payout |
| 6 | Dependency chain | C | F-TAC 61.36% of reserves with no committed fallback; the capital flow is fully traced; coverage at or above 1.000 on all 678 days | Not B: the F-TAC dependency is off-chain and unmitigated. Not D: every layer is identified and traced and the attestor is live; a stricter single-point-of-failure reading gives D |
| 7 | Integration & composability risk | D | $7,593,158 of sUSN-collateral debt across 8 markets = 27.3x depth; 66.1% of one Vesu market is one borrower; instant Euler and Vesu caps; 0 liquidations | Not C: debt far exceeds the 3x bound and 21.9% has no delay-protected ceiling. Not F: no exploit, drain or bad debt |
| 8 | Governance attack surface | C | Core EVM structure: 3-of-N Safes with 48h timelocks on proxy upgrades, now including zkSync. Starknet and Sui upgrade authority: ForDefi MPC wallets with no delay, over 3.09M sUSN | Not B: undelayed runtime powers and undelayed spoke upgrades. Not D: the core EVM structure is multisig-plus-timelock and the spoke keys are held in ForDefi MPC |
Protocol 5 (D). Loss absorption is measured as a stock of codified capital, and that stock is 0.000%. The insurance fund (0.561% of supply) is an uncodified Safe inside reserves, the reserve surplus is economic rather than committed, and the redemption treasury float sits outside the attestation. The par rail has no link to coverage: in a shortfall, Verified Users could keep redeeming at par while queued sUSN holders absorb the loss through s.11. Every one of the 17 treasury payouts to date went to linked whitelisted addresses, and another 4.54M USN went out at par to cluster requesters between 30 September and 5 October. The rail's limit, feed and treasury setters have no bound; since 12 October they sit behind a 4-hour timelock rather than with the owner Safe directly. The row is not F because there is no bad debt and no demonstrated failure.

Protocol 7 (D). On 30 September, $7.59M was borrowed against sUSN across eight markets on Morpho (Ethereum, Base, Berachain), Euler (Base, HyperEVM), Vesu (Starknet) and Market01 (Sui), against roughly $278k of open-market depth to unwind it. 21.9% of that debt, in the Euler and Vesu markets, sits under caps that can be raised with no delay. The oracle family is single-source, with no upgrade delay on any feed. There have been no liquidations on Morpho or Vesu and no bad debt, so the row is not F.

Protocol 6 and Protocol 3 (C). Both sit at the C/D boundary. F-TAC is a critical dependency with no committed fallback, and the liquid buffer covers only about 29% of it; the row is held at C because the whole capital flow is traced and the attestor is live and independent. On fees, there is no on-chain fee setter and rebases can only add assets, but the take share is set off-chain with no on-chain maximum; the row is held at C because no setting can reach held balances.
Protocol 8 (C). Upgrade authority over the Starknet and Sui deployments sits with ForDefi MPC wallets but has no delay. The core Ethereum and EVM structure — 3-of-N Safes, 48-hour timelocks on proxy upgrades (on zkSync since 8 October), a 4-hour timelock on bridge limits, LayerZero configuration and redemption and minter settings, and some runtime powers without a timelock — fits C. The TAC and Sophon deployments, still upgradeable by the deployer key, are deprecated and unlinked at every end. The row moves to D if the spoke authorities gain reach or any core upgrade path loses its timelock, and toward B if Starknet and Sui upgrades gain a delay.
Blockchain DD
Blockchain composite: 2.25. Ethereum holds 60.57% of float and anchors most rows at B. The two C rows are Starknet's lack of forced inclusion (Blockchain 1) and the bridge (Blockchain 7).
| # | Area | Grade | Observation | Why not adjacent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Decentralisation & validator set | C | Float-weighted anchor 1.664 (B); Starknet (5.663% of float, material) is Stage 1 but users cannot force inclusion | Not B: a permissioned, deadline-free bypass is a limited escape hatch at best. Not D: the Security Council minority bypass is read as a limited hatch; without it the Starknet cap would bind the row at D |
| 2 | Consensus & security model | B | Anchor 1.461; Starknet has a whitelisted proposer; Berachain hard fork (Nov 2025) on a minority chain | Not A: five material chains are below A. Not C: no consensus failure on any material chain |
| 3 | Client diversity | B | Anchor 1.648; Ethereum Geth 50.13%, Lighthouse 52.53%; Sui runs a single client (halt Nov 2024) | Not A: material chains below A. Not C: the majority-float chain meets A |
| 4 | Uptime & reliability | B | Anchor 2.068; no Ethereum halt; Base, Starknet, Sui and Berachain have had multi-hour halts | Not A: minority-chain halts. Not C: only an Ethereum degradation would move the row |
| 5 | Maturity & ecosystem | B | Anchor 1.573; Ethereum $53.24B and 1,859 protocols; Berachain −98.8% from peak | Not A: reserved while material chains are below A. Not C: no limb fails on the majority chain |
| 6 | Validator behaviour | B | Anchor 1.808; OFAC-filtering relays 12.82% on Ethereum (minority); validator interventions on Sui and Berachain targeted exploit proceeds | Not A: minority-chain interventions. Not C: no collusion or attack by validators |
| 7 | Bridge security & cross-chain | C | Lockbox 39.43% of supply; 4M/8h per-origin limits live; the Starknet MPC wallet or two Hyperlane validator operators can reach 100% of the lockbox per window | Not B: the weakest path reaches the whole lockbox in one window. Not D: limits are live and timelocked, TAC and Sophon are unlinked and LayerZero legs need 3 verifiers; graded on the weakest path alone the row would be D |
| 8 | Regulatory & jurisdictional | B | Anchor 1.757; Base and Starknet have single-jurisdiction operators; Berachain and HyperEVM restrict US persons | Not A: material single-jurisdiction operators. Not C: no limb fails on Ethereum |
Blockchain 7 (C). Remote sUSN is minted on each spoke only by bridge messages from registered remotes, and is backed 1:1 by 11.05M sUSN (39.43% of supply) held in the Ethereum vault. Since 1 October each enrolled origin can release at most 4M sUSN per 8-hour window, and since 6–8 October the limits on Ethereum, Base, Berachain, HyperEVM, Citrea and zkSync sit behind a 4-hour timelock owned by each chain's Safe, which can no longer change them directly. TAC and Sophon are deprecated: on Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM their routes point to the dead address with 1 wei limits, LayerZero peers to Sophon are cleared, both were unenrolled from Starknet on 2 October, and Berachain and Citrea were never connected. LayerZero legs require three verifiers (LayerZero Labs, Nansen and Horizen on Sui), and on Ethereum USN and sUSN and on zkSync the LayerZero delegate is the 4-hour timelock, so DVN, library and skip changes take 4 hours; Hyperlane configuration remains instant. The two uninitialised Flare deployments have no peers. No upgrade is pending on any chain's timelock. The weakness is the weakest path. The Starknet sUSN owner, a ForDefi MPC wallet, can upgrade the token with no delay and, through the hub, HyperEVM and zkSync lanes, reach 12M sUSN per window — more than the whole lockbox. The two Hyperlane validator operators on the default route reach the same amount, and the Sui MPC wallet reaches 4M (36.2%).

Strategy & counterparty exposure
USN reserves by sleeve, Accountable, 5 October 2026:
| Leg | $ | % of reserves | Custodian / venue | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fasanara F-TAC private credit | 24,860,236 | 61.36% | Fasanara (Luxembourg ELTIF) | Signed weekly report (28 Sep) |
| Hyperliquid HYPE basis (lending + margin) | 6,384,131 | 15.76% | ForDefi / operator wallet | On-chain |
| Stable cash (incl. $1.47M USDC at ForDefi and the $0.20M insurance fund) | 2,825,367 | 6.97% | ForDefi / Safe / Noon wallets | On-chain |
| US T-bills (Dinari USD+) | 2,664,772 | 6.58% | Alpaca / operator wallet | On-chain (zkTLS-bound) |
| JAAA AAA-CLO ETF | 1,792,364 | 4.42% | Alpaca | On-chain |
| Euler lending | 1,010,624 | 2.49% | ForDefi | On-chain |
| Morpho lending | 979,679 | 2.42% | ForDefi | On-chain |
The seven lines sum exactly to the $40,517,173 attested. The redemption treasury float ($140,483) sits outside the attestation.
| Counterparty | Exposure | Return | Record | Recoverability |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fasanara F-TAC (AIFM Ascender Fund Partners; auditor KPMG) | $24.86M | About 10.1% implied on the mark (15% target) | No F-TAC cash receipt observed at a Noon wallet since 2025; accrual recognised weekly | T+3 months native; administrator and depositary undisclosed |
| Hyperliquid (basis venue, HyperCore lending) | $6.38M | Funding about 8% of gross return | Position grew about 24% since 30 Sep | Hedge ratio 1.0001; liquidation price +87.2%; spot HYPE now supplied to HyperCore lending under portfolio margin |
| Alpaca / Dinari (T-bills) | $2.66M (−$1.30M since 30 Sep) | About 4% | Balance bound to the operator wallet | Daily liquid |
| Alpaca (JAAA) | $1.79M | About 5.5% | — | ETF daily liquidity |
| Morpho / Euler | $1.99M | About 6% | — | On-chain, subject to pool liquidity |
| ForDefi (custody of the operator wallet) | 27.14% of reserves | — | — | MPC custody claimed first-party only; address-poisoning campaign live |
| Nexus Mutual (cover) | $2.77M (3 policies) | — | — | Cover terms not reviewed |
The net read:
- The dominant exposure is credit, not basis. 63.46% of liabilities and about 80% of the yield rest on one fund's manager-signed mark, and recovery is limited to the $1.34M surplus. The surplus is wider than on 30 September (5.41% break-even against 2.40%) but still small.
- The basis leg is hedged but now layered. It grew 24% and moved into HyperCore portfolio margin and lending, which adds an upstream lending-protocol dependency. Funding legs are only about 8% of gross return, and the unwind is on the same venue.
- The holder base is a credit structure. The three largest holders are the borrower wallets of Noon's Accountable vault programme, all managed by one investment manager. A depositor redemption wave would force the same wallets that make the sUSN market to unwind together.
Holder concentration. Canonical supply on 5 October was 28,024,429 sUSN.
| # | Holder | Token / venue | % supply | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0x272BB989F1a272758cB8070f94Cb6540E9C20005 | sUSN wallet; Symphony vault loan borrower (Arbitrum) | 34.17 | Operator-linked |
| 2 | 0x7e03eA3852489D3A3326ac51c1f81dFd8b1d3705 | sUSN wallet + Morpho/Euler loops; Monad vault loan borrower | 27.87 | Operator-linked |
| 3 | 0xf0d3B3C52512a7a229Bc27065Fb99CE564eD5e30 | sUSN + Base/HyperEVM/Berachain loops; Citrea vault loan borrower | 17.06 | Operator-linked |
| 4 | 0x5476F4E23dAA093Ce6700e1026013c55F7AF9083 | Makina Caliber via Royco senior tranche (Base) | 4.48 | Third party |
| 5 | 0x95780F943b6361FB11eEd893cf1237Dd9B3F54AF | Pendle, Royco junior; sole LP of the USN/USDT and sUSN/USN pools | ~3.6 | Operator-linked |
| 6 | 0x4ac4f6c2262f829c82d01be3f0f0db0e2a72fa2a16d38fc9e34e3f36b166d8d | Vesu Clearstar Reactor depositor (Starknet) | 2.48 | Third party |
| 7 | 0xC1F39C3A1BD08a792a8B650fFc2cf03343B11CB4 | sUSN (Ethereum) | 1.98 | Third party |
| 8 | 0x6d9013c2f8691040307a9e5bae6750f5808f3b7f297d80f7f196f7054c7ad67b | Sui sUSN (coin + Market01 loop) | 1.93 | Operator-linked |
| 9 | 0xE6bAA323545Bd92A5Db289F5368a5eDeEC059B52 | sUSN (Ethereum) | 1.44 | Operator-linked |
| 10 | 0x187040e4b230e352758a4e7d76c9b42e1ec5191a5227007f688cd67400534563 | Sui sUSN market-maker wallet | 1.24 | Operator-linked |
The dominant cluster is linked on-chain to the operator: it gas-funds the deployer, minter and redemption-treasury keys, and its three largest wallets are the named borrowers of Noon's own vault programme. That they belong to the same legal entity as Noon is not established; no cluster address is a signer on a Noon Safe.
Noon's first-party registry lists six Accountable vaults whose loans are all managed by one codeless investment manager (0xd85E704a1f234cF319D9708B9130AEDC1c40c017). Vault depositors hold a USDC credit claim on the borrower, not sUSN, and vault liquidity is thin: the Symphony vault holds 258,391 USDC against 11.77M shares, and the Monad vault 13,880 USDC against 7.21M. The cluster has also been the main source of USN collateral: the original collateral Safe passed through $118.06M, fed by the top three wallets ($25.19M, $11.04M and $6.75M of USDC), and is now empty. A registry jump of 886k sUSN for the second-largest wallet, with unchanged supply, was not yet confirmed on-chain at the read.

Operational risk
- Team. noon.capital/about names nine team members by first name only, with roles, and eight link a LinkedIn profile. The page names no surnames, directors, officers, legal entity or regulator, and the profiles were not independently verified. The deployer key that still holds TAC and Sophon upgrade authority is labelled in the Safe registry with an engineer's name, so one person's account retains upgrade power over those deprecated, unlinked spokes.
- Company and legal structure. The issuer is Noon YBS Issuer Ltd (BVI). Noon HoldCo Ltd is the separate platform operator named in the sUSN Staking Terms. Noon has confirmed directly that HoldCo is the holding company for all Noon activities, structured as an orphaned entity with its shares held by a BVI Purpose Trust. No registry extract could be obtained, and no licence is disclosed.
- Investors and funding. Not disclosed; no priced round, backers or amounts were found.
- Custody and attestation. F-TAC is held in a Luxembourg ELTIF sub-fund whose administrator and depositary are not disclosed. The operator wallet holds the Hyperliquid, T-bill and DeFi legs; its ForDefi MPC custody is claimed first-party only. Alpaca holds the T-bills and JAAA, and the insurance fund is a Safe. Accountable attests reserves every 15 minutes with Merkle-root, TEE, ZK and zkTLS proofs for on-chain lines; the F-TAC and Binance lines are at the signed-report level.
- Key-person and custody risk sits on four codeless operator keys (the deployer, the minter, the redemption approver/treasury and the operator wallet). Whether any is a single hot key is not established.
- Address poisoning now targets both the reserve wallet and, since 3 October, the Operations Fund wallet. Every manual treasury top-up is a potential mis-send.
Governance & privileged roles
Upgrade and admin authority differs sharply by chain. The core Ethereum deployment sits behind a 3-of-6 Safe and a 48-hour upgrade timelock, and bridge limits, LayerZero configuration and redemption and minter settings take 4 hours to change. Several runtime powers on that Safe still have no delay, and the spokes range from multisig-plus-timelock to MPC wallets with no delay.
| Chain | Float share | Upgrade authority | Delay | Notable undelayed powers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum (hub) | 60.57% | ProxyAdmins → Upgrade Timelock → Safe 3-of-6 | 48 h on upgrades; 4 h on bridge limits, LayerZero configuration and redemption and minter settings | USN setAdmin + uncapped mint; pause of vault and USN; setWithdrawalHandler (no event); USN blacklist over the withdrawal escrow; Hyperlane configuration |
| Base | 21.99% | ProxyAdmin → Timelock → Safe 3-of-5 | 48 h; 4 h on rate limits | Mailbox, ISM and remote-token configuration by the Safe; admin and blacklist roles held by the Safe only |
| Starknet | 5.66% | ForDefi MPC wallet (Braavos account) | none | Instant upgrade(ClassHash); reach of 12M sUSN per window through the hub lanes |
| Sui | 5.38% | ForDefi MPC wallet (UpgradeCaps and OApp AdminCap) | none | Package upgrades; reach of 4M sUSN per window |
| Berachain | 3.59% | ProxyAdmin → Timelock → Safe 3-of-5 | 48 h; 4 h on rate limits | Admin and blacklist roles held by the Safe only since the deployer renounced them on 30 Sep |
| HyperEVM | 2.80% | ProxyAdmin → Timelock → Safe 3-of-5 | 24 h; 4 h on rate limits | Admin and blacklist roles held by the Safe only |
| Citrea | ~0% | ProxyAdmin → Timelock → Safe 3-of-5 | 48 h; 4 h on rate limits | Admin and blacklist roles held by the Safe only; all five Safe signers are codeless addresses, custody unverified |
| zkSync Era | ~0% | ProxyAdmins → Timelock → Safe 3-of-4 | 48 h (since 8 Oct); 4 h on rate limits and LayerZero configuration | Both proxies were re-implemented outside the Ethereum timelock queue before the timelock was added |
| TAC, Sophon | ~0% | ProxyAdmins → deployer key | none | Deprecated and unlinked at every end: dead-address routes at 1 wei on Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM, Sophon peers cleared, unenrolled from Starknet |
| Power | Holder | Delay | Bound / use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pause vault and USN | Owner Safe 3-of-6 | 0 s | Pausing the vault freezes all transfers, including cooldown entry. Never used |
Exit re-point (setWithdrawalHandler) | Owner Safe | 0 s | Emits no event and has no getter. Never used |
| Escrow freeze (USN blacklist of the withdrawal escrow) | Owner Safe | 0 s | Freeze only, no seizure. Never used |
Cooldown length (setWithdrawPeriod) | Generic Timelock | 48 h | Unbounded and retroactive. Set to zero three times in 2025 and restored the same day |
| Mint | Owner Safe; codeless minter key | 0 s | USN setAdmin + mint uncapped; mintAndRebase 25k USN per call (209 calls, 1.39M USN to date), a cap that takes 4 h to change |
| Redemption-rail and minter settings (redemption limits, treasury, price feeds, pause, whitelist, mint limits, rebase limit, custody wallet) | 4h Timelock; the owner Safe renounced direct admin on 12 Oct | 4 h | Covers RedeemHandlerV2 and MinterHandlerV2. A cut in the oracle staleness window from 48 h to 25 h is queued |
| Bridge rate limits | 4h Timelock owned by each chain's Safe | 4 h | 0 means unlimited, 1 wei is an effective halt. Set on 1 October; behind the timelock on Ethereum, Base, Berachain, HyperEVM, Citrea and zkSync since 6–8 October |
| LayerZero configuration (DVNs, libraries, skips) | 4h Timelock as delegate on Ethereum USN and sUSN and on zkSync | 4 h | Delegate since 8 October |
| Hyperlane reconfiguration (ISM, remote tokens, routes) | Vault admin Safe and remote owner Safes | 0 s | Routine registrations |
| Hyperlane inbound pause | Hyperlane's PausableIsm owner | 0 s | Never used |
| Stuck-message reconciliation | Vault owner Safe | 48 h | Moves locked sUSN to the owner; not observed |
The vault upgrade approved on 10 June 2026, which had sat past its ETA, was cancelled on 12 October (tx 0x9c16bcd0d9aa0d68457e5bc15fd157e1e475f2981940e6c07639f4ef5713f07e). No upgrade is pending on any chain's timelock.
On Ethereum, USN is minted by MinterHandlerV2, whose mint is capped at 10M per block and per day (limits that take 4 hours to change) and whose mintAndRebase is capped at 25,000 USN per call with no aggregate limit. A codeless key has held the MINTER role since 16 September. On the remote chains, sUSN is minted only by bridge messages from registered remotes, now bounded at 4M per origin per 8 hours.
Audit & code integrity
| Audit firm | Date(s) | Scope | Findings | Deployed-code match |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hashlock | Jun 2025, Nov 2025, Mar 2026, Sep 2026 | Sep 2026: bridge rate limiter and the USN, vault and remote builds executed on 1 Oct | Sep 2026: 0 High, 1 Medium acknowledged (possible double payout on stuck-message reconciliation) | Fix-review commit 81ef548c equals the live Ethereum vault and USN and the Base, HyperEVM, Berachain and Citrea implementations |
| Sherlock (collaborative) | 16–26 Jun 2026; report 21 Jul 2026 | MinterHandlerV2, periphery and timelock, RedeemHandlerV2, remote sUSN, vault and USN Hyperlane builds | 0 Critical / 0 High / 6 Medium / 8 Low (2 Medium resolved, 4 acknowledged) | Audited fcf78793, final 45ee4e19; MinterHandlerV2 diverges from the final commit |
| MoveBit | Jun 2026 | Sui only | Not captured | — |
| Halborn | Dec 2024; Mar 2025 | Staking vault | Not captured | — |
| Quantstamp | Sep 2024 | Not captured | Not captured | — |
The bug bounty is described in Noon's docs as an "active bug bounty" reached by email; no platform, tiers or payouts are published.
Deployed code outside audited scope or diverging:
- MinterHandlerV2 runs the build Sherlock audited before remediation. It differs by +100/−31 lines from the final commit, keeps the signed
mint()path and lacks a pause, so the fixes were never redeployed. - WithdrawalHandler (the 7-day cooldown escrow) is byte-identical to the audited repository commit but is outside Sherlock's scope list.
- zkSync Era sUSN and USN run OFT variants re-implemented outside the Ethereum timelock queue; they are verified on the zkSync explorer, but the builds are outside Sherlock's scope and Hashlock coverage is not established. Further zkSync upgrades go through a 48-hour timelock since 8 October.
- Sophon and TAC deployments, now deprecated and unlinked, have not been diffed against any audit, and the Stork oracle proxies on Base, Arbitrum, Citrea and HyperEVM are third-party code outside Noon's audits.
The fund-holding Ethereum proxies changed on 1 October 2026 and equal the Hashlock September 2026 fix-review commit, so they are covered by the latest audit. The full cross-check is in the appendix.
Risks & caveats
- The rated holder is a Verified User. Asset 3's C applies to an onboarded Verified User with par redemption through RedeemHandlerV2. Holders who are not KYB-onboarded have no par path; for them the open-market exit meets the F condition on liquidity, and they should not rely on this rating's liquidity grade.
- The F-gate, not the tier, is the fragile edge. A one-letter deterioration of the F-TAC cluster (Asset 7 and Protocol 6) moves Asset 7 to F and fails the gate; the favourable case (2.67) does not change the tier. A realised F-TAC loss, a withdrawn Verified User route or a non-dust redemption refusal would each move a row toward F or D.
- Confidence. Seven rows are graded at low confidence: Asset 2, 4 and 5, Protocol 3, 6 and 8, and Blockchain 7. Several C rows sit at the C/D boundary on a stricter reading: Asset 2 on gross wallet balances, Asset 5 and 8, Protocol 3, 6 and 8, and Blockchain 1 and 7. Asset 4 would be C if the open sUSN discount to NAV were weighed over daily closes.
- Coverage is trusted, not independently verified, for most of the book. Coverage of 1.0343 holds numerically, but 61.36% of reserves rests on a signed report with no independent administrator statement.
- Time-sensitive state. Reflexive-debt figures and the paid APY were last measured on 30 September.
- Differences from VALIS. VALIS reports two codeless keys' roles as revoked; this review finds REBASE_MANAGER live on the vault for both, legacy redeemer roles still in the role records, and the deployer key as sole TAC and Sophon upgrader. VALIS's Bridge Security F is assessed here under Blockchain 7. The VALIS review is dated 23 September 2026, before the 1 October upgrades.
- Custody is unverified. Addresses cannot distinguish MPC custody from a bare key; the deployer, minter, approver and operator keys are all codeless, so grades assume the full function scope of each key.
- Data limits. Etherscan does not serve Flare, zkSync, Sophon or Citrea, so native endpoints were used. Odos was unreachable and OpenOcean returned no usable route. Registry searches in the BVI and Panama were inaccessible, which is not a negative result. Accountable exposes one reserve wallet address, so a per-wallet reserve list was not independently evidenced.
- Open questions: redemption and credit. How does the par rail behave for the first arms-length Verified User (lead time, outcome, treasury top-up), and will the issuer commit to a written redemption SLA or refill obligation? Can an independent F-TAC administrator or depositary NAV statement be obtained, and does F-TAC accumulate or distribute its yield?
- Open questions: keys and entities. Who holds the four codeless operator keys, and through what custody? Will Starknet and Sui upgrades gain a delay? Who is the legal borrower behind the vault-programme wallets and their investment manager?
- Open questions: hygiene. Does ForDefi's policy engine allowlist destinations against the address-poisoning campaign?
- The rating reflects reserve, market and holder evidence through 5 October 2026, 10:53 UTC, and governance, bridge and role state through 12 October 2026, including changes confirmed by Noon; the entity descriptions incorporate direct clarification from Noon. Reserve, liquidity, governance, bridge and integration state can change materially after that date.
Appendix
Further risks, ranked 11–19
| # | Risk | Mechanism | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | Off-chain take and unbounded rail levers | Take set via rebase size with no on-chain maximum; redemption-rail setters unbounded, behind only a 4-hour timelock; two codeless keys among the rebase managers | Medium |
| 12 | Starknet censorship / no forced inclusion | 5.663% of float on an L2 without a user escape hatch | Medium |
| 13 | Operator wallet custody and address poisoning | The operator wallet runs the basis and T-bill legs; manual top-ups under a lookalike campaign that now also targets the Operations Fund wallet | Medium |
| 14 | Sustained sUSN discount to NAV | Pool price −0.60% vs NAV for 6.6 days with no arbitrage | Medium |
| 15 | Instant exit re-point or freeze by the Safe | setWithdrawalHandler (no event), pause, USN blacklist of the escrow | Medium |
| 16 | Single-source Stork integrator oracle | Instant Stork Safe upgrades, one signing key, no fallback; nanosecond timestamps defeat staleness checks | Medium |
| 17 | Limiter durability | Buckets settable to 0 (unlimited) after a 4-hour timelock; Hyperlane configuration remains instant | Low |
| 18 | Chain halts on minority legs | Base, Starknet, Sui and Berachain have had multi-hour halts | Low |
| 19 | Thin peg band | No bid below 0.98995 once the cluster's liquidity band is exhausted | Low |
Deployed code vs audit — all contracts
Latest audit on record: Hashlock "Bridge rate limiter v1" (September 2026, fix-review commit 81ef548c).
| Contract | Current implementation | Last upgrade (UTC) | Latest audit | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Ethereum sUSN vault 0xE24a3DC889621612422A64E6388927901608B91D | 0xeF2eA4250B7CE4D0aA9Ca70607ECeF278C6EAB15 | 2026-10-01 17:48 | Hashlock Sep 2026 | Covered |
Ethereum USN 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD | 0x79FD7FE2a8EbcAE47798321b2AC97107dF3de229 | 2026-10-01 17:48 | Hashlock Sep 2026 | Covered |
RedeemHandlerV2 0xAb0c423975B446e785E21B9b10F3B421c8ED9197 | Non-proxy (created 2026-09-17) | — | Sherlock Jul 2026 | Covered (trivial diff) |
Upgrade Timelock 0xE5e412C212B4FBbF550A94e7BD5e83dB0B315A7F | Non-proxy | — | Sherlock Jul 2026 | Covered (import paths only) |
Bridge rate limiter 0xe8c94FA4FEdFa21B1d0D0Dd78E41bCE9d99d959F and EVM-remote twins | Non-upgradeable | — | Hashlock Sep 2026 | Covered |
MinterHandlerV2 0xB91b361ebE4022Bb62dF0651bDD09b21209ac058 | Non-proxy | — | Sherlock Jul 2026 | Not covered (pre-remediation build) |
WithdrawalHandler 0x0DaBc0D9B270c9B0C4C77AaCeAa712b56D0F9178 | Non-proxy | — | Sherlock Jul 2026 | Not covered (outside scope list) |
Legacy redeemer 0xF5DEAfcdFbC21Cb1E558906d00A1Fdb4b56173e8 | Non-proxy | — | — | Unknown |
Base sUSN 0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999F | 0xa02Ca8C6130B75b320FAa785034E95D4374A8942 | 2026-10-01 | Hashlock Sep 2026 | Covered |
HyperEVM sUSN 0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999F | 0xffC95e7E447DC94DcE706B8afda751349E676227 | 2026-10-01 | Hashlock Sep 2026 | Covered |
Berachain sUSN 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD | 0x657284c8337ab91b1a7d4eb66Be97596f4878117 | 2026-10-01 | Hashlock Sep 2026 | Covered |
Citrea sUSN 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD | 0x6D1019bdbe1Da163134Aba821bBfc1cCAEb988a8 | 2026-10-01 | Hashlock Sep 2026 | Covered |
zkSync Era sUSN 0xB6a09d426861c63722Aa0b333a9cE5d5a9B04c4f | 0x8B9E886B6850615911c61a7cd10c9C6630d1A03d | After 2025-07-09 | Hashlock Sep 2026 / Sherlock Jul 2026 | Not covered (OFT variant) |
zkSync Era USN 0x0469d9d1dE0ee58fA1153ef00836B9BbCb84c0B6 | 0xb00B492099323E386dFD1E014850Ca16396E8C22 | After 2025-07-24 | Hashlock Sep 2026 / Sherlock Jul 2026 | Not covered (OFT variant) |
Sophon sUSN 0xb87DbE27Db932baCAAA96478443b6519D52C5004 | 0xF280F30e0dBde661CE8E38ACD658Fc40F755EF80 | 2025-07-09 | — | Unknown |
Sophon USN 0xC1AA99c3881B26901aF70738A7C217dc32536d36 | 0xF90d5784E175b6142958Ec32B77B7aa63582d957 | 2025-07-12 | — | Unknown |
Sophon USN, second deployment 0x0469d9d1dE0ee58fA1153ef00836B9BbCb84c0B6 | 0xc3068D1deAEd95bf821DE67f560A353600e8A07a (unverified) | 2024-12-09 | — | Unknown |
TAC sUSN 0x5Ced7F73B76A555CCB372cc0F0137bEc5665F81E | 0x6D1019bdbe1Da163134Aba821bBfc1cCAEb988a8 (not diffed) | Not captured | — | Unknown |
Stork oracle, Base 0x647DFd812BC1e116c6992CB2bC353b2112176fD6 | 0x90e093B850d4eeA5bcd29E6657589E45f78eF53B | 2026-05-07 | Third party | Unknown |
Stork oracle, Arbitrum / Citrea / HyperEVM 0xacC0a0cF13571d30B4b8637996F5D6D774d4fd62 | 0x376AdC2c…, 0xF89CEf90…, 0x6e498b02… | 2026-05-07 / 2026-06-12 / 2026-05-07 | Third party | Unknown |
Contract inventory — Ethereum
| Contract | Address | Upgrade authority | Delay | Audit coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| USN (proxy) | 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD | ProxyAdmin 0x55f39512cb43111A13E8440ee3e3602e72628239 → Upgrade Timelock → owner Safe | 48 h | Covered |
| sUSN ERC-4626 vault (proxy) | 0xE24a3DC889621612422A64E6388927901608B91D | ProxyAdmin 0x1908284b50EE152C9f00c8E65a81fc1C4520BD81 → Upgrade Timelock → owner Safe | 48 h | Covered |
| MinterHandlerV2 | 0xB91b361ebE4022Bb62dF0651bDD09b21209ac058 | Non-upgradeable; admin 4h Timelock (since 12 Oct) | 4 h | Not covered |
| RedeemHandlerV2 | 0xAb0c423975B446e785E21B9b10F3B421c8ED9197 | Non-upgradeable; admin 4h Timelock (since 12 Oct); approver and treasury 0xFeD8617Fb46461E5CeBe4976Bf0ebD87689Ef14E (codeless) | 4 h | Covered |
| Legacy redeemer | 0xF5DEAfcdFbC21Cb1E558906d00A1Fdb4b56173e8 | Non-upgradeable | — | Unknown |
| WithdrawalHandler (7-day escrow) | 0x0DaBc0D9B270c9B0C4C77AaCeAa712b56D0F9178 | Non-upgradeable; admin Generic Timelock | — | Not covered (outside scope list) |
| Bridge rate limiter | 0xe8c94FA4FEdFa21B1d0D0Dd78E41bCE9d99d959F | Non-upgradeable; setRateLimits behind the 4h Timelock | 4 h | Covered |
| Upgrade Timelock | 0xE5e412C212B4FBbF550A94e7BD5e83dB0B315A7F | Owner Safe | 48 h | Covered |
| 4h Timelock (rate limits, LayerZero delegate, redemption and minter admin) | 0x398dCDdae394198E6f81d6d8f827CF93b60fB5AE | Owner Safe | 4 h | Unknown |
| Generic Timelock (WithdrawalHandler admin) | 0x36857EF0B10A61A68d58C29eE256990fa9699722 | Owner Safe | 48 h | Unknown |
| Owner Safe (3-of-6) | 0x1ea169EcCcf7714E7ba04900e1a3357cCA77327f | Self | none | — |
| Collateral Safe (pass-through, now empty) | 0x365bd6fb4200e422a2b1f7b9Dfb1C00471E6D089 | Self | none | — |
| Operator wallet (minter custodial wallet, Hyperliquid account) | 0x4fD04553468610e5a88a2cffA38E057C954312Da | No code (MPC claimed first-party) | — | — |
| Insurance Fund Safe | 0x646Db2928d04a947d485fD8267b236B817d89daA | Self | none | — |
| USN fixed-rate oracle | 0xBd154793659D1E6ea0C58754cEd6807059A421b0 | Immutable | — | Unknown |
| sUSN rate-provider oracle | 0x7f741401422Afff770360fD13127F7462C6E1A79 | Immutable | — | Unknown |
| Morpho oracles, sUSN/USDC and sUSN/USDT | 0xC415Cc3F04F9074A9562aEEe02591e65D39A94aa, 0x3B26BEE26e7eA5225b459abB7433eAb4ea52ed01 | Immutable | — | Unknown |
| Stork-Chainlink adapter (USN/USD capped) | 0x6E46353f6ba66e22289aAE9ffa79E1BFD593219e | Immutable (third party) | — | Unknown |
| USN/USD Stork rate provider | 0x78FC48b3bb59d8a1F29d4ff8c78Bba64E9374F97 | Third party | — | Unknown |
| PT oracles (Chainlink infrequent, Spectra) | 0xc0D62E2470A585C8a638B123A78ff31b593af8Ae, 0x76d048e47E1d77940416B656D8D7FEd34931a393 | Immutable; Spectra oracle owned by the deployer key | — | Unknown |
Addresses that earlier inventories listed under Ethereum but that hold no code there (other chains' Safes, timelocks and token deployments) are shown under their own chains below.
Contract inventory — Base
| Contract | Address | Upgrade authority | Delay | Audit coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sUSN (proxy) | 0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999F | ProxyAdmin 0xdDC0416e9bB96Dd1408CbAb19b48bd7d7B1498A7 → Timelock 0xA9BB96bb79492Aa64199f078362ECd069D565e85 → Safe | 48 h | Covered |
| Owner Safe (3-of-5) | 0xf56d33ef52642ce226A566610A979DC8d954592D | Self | none | — |
| Stork oracle (proxy) | 0x647DFd812BC1e116c6992CB2bC353b2112176fD6 | Stork Safe 0xA994817A177cBBd345890f059D6F60E10381b4De (3-of-6) | none | Unknown (third party) |
| Stork-Chainlink adapters (USN/USD, sUSN/USN) | 0x0e658Ea83d19e540a5b4cf6BC2A6093a55525561, 0x907fb22C2DA56642F89702b0970a03ed13EbF136 | Immutable | — | Unknown (third party) |
Contract inventory — HyperEVM
| Contract | Address | Upgrade authority | Delay | Audit coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sUSN (proxy) | 0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999F | ProxyAdmin 0xdDC0416e9bB96Dd1408CbAb19b48bd7d7B1498A7 → Timelock 0x73D59063212c1A3fD32882d46A84EFb37911550d → Safe 0x3D6B578afDfdcd9e74EB0CdbDdCf2435502FC5b8 (3-of-5) | 24 h | Covered |
| Stork oracle (proxy) | 0xacC0a0cF13571d30B4b8637996F5D6D774d4fd62 | Stork Safe 0x904E43857922C08033f47AF3Cf09074FBbf8Bf69 (3-of-6) | none | Unknown (third party) |
| Stork-Chainlink adapters | 0x9A137Fdbe8BbB6065626098818dC82D26c20659b, 0xf08C4a8f113c8a90788F02b8151085eb9bC01E0e | Immutable | — | Unknown (third party) |
Contract inventory — Berachain
| Contract | Address | Upgrade authority | Delay | Audit coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sUSN (proxy) | 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD | ProxyAdmin 0x55f39512cb43111A13E8440ee3e3602e72628239 → Timelock 0xea84aC70f00f47ad6FBE51233AAE25799B9f0A02 → Safe 0x94E9f383b085D32973634EA7c9bB2038eF9a3C58 (3-of-5) | 48 h | Covered |
The Berachain Hyperlane Mailbox is unverified on Berascan and Sourcify.
Contract inventory — Citrea
| Contract | Address | Upgrade authority | Delay | Audit coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sUSN (proxy) | 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD | ProxyAdmin 0x55f39512cb43111A13E8440ee3e3602e72628239 → Timelock 0xf6f40baAFBCbB29855F4D9A29576B812E0B33fac → Safe 0xB2aD758Ee2710527A28d906F9588938c2e5cFc80 (3-of-5, all signers codeless) | 48 h | Covered |
| Stork oracle (proxy) | 0xacC0a0cF13571d30B4b8637996F5D6D774d4fd62 | Stork Safe 0xDCC60a128A62D65c35DcB095C751cC26fBF8895A (3-of-6) | none | Unknown (third party) |
| Stork-Chainlink adapters | 0x9A137Fdbe8BbB6065626098818dC82D26c20659b, 0xf08C4a8f113c8a90788F02b8151085eb9bC01E0e | Immutable; no staleness or deviation guard | — | Unknown (third party) |
Contract inventory — zkSync Era
| Contract | Address | Upgrade authority | Delay | Audit coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sUSN (proxy) | 0xB6a09d426861c63722Aa0b333a9cE5d5a9B04c4f | ProxyAdmin 0x5130C9cd9e85B4a95F9b44c7Eb8667106e8fdecc → Timelock 0x6E7FD7751649993a8C01837Ab7f035d21E6f2Ace → Safe 0x15d91EB2c3188BB85881D2E09b5025F3Fcc4a263 (3-of-4) | 48 h | Not covered (OFT variant) |
| USN (proxy) | 0x0469d9d1dE0ee58fA1153ef00836B9BbCb84c0B6 | ProxyAdmin 0x5a82384A042cCe41f9aC6F0C110773E5B3266F11 → Timelock 0x6E7FD7751649993a8C01837Ab7f035d21E6f2Ace → Safe 0x15d91EB2c3188BB85881D2E09b5025F3Fcc4a263 (3-of-4) | 48 h | Not covered (OFT variant) |
Contract inventory — Sophon and TAC
| Contract | Address | Upgrade authority | Delay | Audit coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sophon sUSN (proxy) | 0xb87DbE27Db932baCAAA96478443b6519D52C5004 | ProxyAdmin 0x90D0307D14009B9081CAb5a3eE92C62625649D5f → deployer key 0x173806021b18c4E60170e412DC88F991eB00D699 | none | Unknown |
| Sophon USN (proxy) | 0xC1AA99c3881B26901aF70738A7C217dc32536d36 | ProxyAdmin 0xaD871a241D1fE8Dd6293d6746D1898d211cF5890 → Safe 0x553d36879016Ce22977a622804EeE76Dc0dC88e0 (3-of-4) | none | Unknown |
| Sophon USN, second deployment (zero supply, no peers) | 0x0469d9d1dE0ee58fA1153ef00836B9BbCb84c0B6 | ProxyAdmin 0x5a82384A042cCe41f9aC6F0C110773E5B3266F11 → deployer key; implementation unverified | none | Unknown |
| Sophon unverified contract (zero supply, no peers) | 0xB6a09d426861c63722Aa0b333a9cE5d5a9B04c4f | Unresolved (no proxy slots, no owner) | Unresolved | Unknown |
| TAC sUSN (proxy) | 0x5Ced7F73B76A555CCB372cc0F0137bEc5665F81E | ProxyAdmin 0x36849808656f85ecEb5Fb6AEbd8e4c1532B6cFc7 → deployer key; bridge configuration under Safe 0x868Dd9BCe1d60362f2169E7b91E6aA2f71F64750 (3-of-6) | none | Unknown |
TAC and Sophon are deprecated and unlinked at every end. On Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM their routes point to the dead address with limits of 1 wei, Ethereum and zkSync no longer peer Sophon, both were unenrolled from Starknet on 2 October, and Berachain and Citrea were never connected, so neither chain can draw on the Ethereum lockbox.
Starknet, Sui and discovery-only chains
- Starknet sUSN
0x02411565ef1a14decfbe83d2e987cced918cd752508a3d9c55deb67148d14d17: owner0x25beda2df6bff2e5328d8dc873dd91c0c5ed3fac4ba9f295c022ea3217c3072, a Braavos v1.2.0 account with one signer, which can callupgrade(ClassHash)with no delay. The signer appears on-chain as a single key; Noon has confirmed it is held in ForDefi MPC. Inbound messages use the default aggregation ISM (Ethereum 6-of-9 validators plus a pausable ISM). - Sui sUSN coin package
0x0a672389b7b73df60d40666ac9545433d59d3128086b9e3a425a66bbffdf4dc5and OFT package0xa356ca2010fcdf44d6cecfcecf18b73c32188d361e39dff3a96ac8de0dec7b1b: UpgradeCaps (compatible policy) and the OApp AdminCap are held by0x67cddd47a21038c0bf126096615a06d4dc33bb2de1ea991fff8461875321906d, which appears on-chain as a single Ed25519 key; Noon has confirmed it is held in ForDefi MPC. There is no delay (latest admin transaction 2 Oct 2026). Receives from Ethereum require three verifiers (LayerZero Labs, Nansen, Horizen) and 15 confirmations. - Flare: two uninitialised OFTs (
0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999F,0xf6f40baAFBCbB29855F4D9A29576B812E0B33fac) with zero supply and no peers could be claimed by whoever first callsinitialize(); this is contained because no live route peers Flare. A third OFT (0xF98AF70f2A5a9526248076Df6706Ac96BD1F8A41) has zero supply, no peers and the deployer key as owner. - Arbitrum and Avalanche: only Stork oracle contracts were found (
0xacC0a0cF13571d30B4b8637996F5D6D774d4fd62). The Arbitrum proxy is upgradeable by a Stork Safe with no delay; the Avalanche address is a bare, uninitialised implementation whose upgrade authority is unresolved. No sUSN deployment is evidenced on either chain.